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Who is Guilty and What to Do? Popular Opinion and Public Discourse of
Corruption in Russian Higher Education

Qui est coupable et que faut-il faire? L’opinion populaire et le
discours public de la corruption dans l’éducation supérieure russe
Ararat L. Osipian, Vanderbilt University
Abstract
Corruption in higher education in Russia is a growing problem. This paper considers the scholarly
and popular discourse in Russia around this corruption and the discussion examines its context
within the overall corruptness of the society and reflects on measures of comprehensive educational
reform. Drawing upon a theoretical framework linking popular opinion and public discourse,
discussion in the scholarly and popular press between 1998 and 2011 is analyzed, and the themes of
the discourse are traced. Results focus on the reasons for corruption in the higher education sector, as
well as on current and potential ways to tackle corruption, including the newly introduced
standardized testing. Even though the national test will not solve the problem of corruption in
education, its full scale, country-wide implementation at this point appears to be inevitable.

Résumé
La corruption dans l’éducation supérieure russe est un problème croissant. Cet article examine les
discours académiques et populaires en relation avec la corruption. La discussion définit le contexte
général de la corruption dans la société russe et met l’accent sur des mesures à mettre en place pour
qu’une réforme globale du système éducatif soit factible. Ce travail se base sur un cadre conceptuel
qui met en relation l’opinion populaire et le discours public. Il analyse les discussions polulaires et
publiques dans la presse entre 1998 et 2011. Cette analyse retrace les thèmes principaux inhérents à
cette discussion. Les résultats de l’analyse se concentrent sur les raisons de la corruption dans
l’éducation supérieure russe, sur les différentes façons possibles pour abattre la corruption et sur
l’introduction de l’examen standard. Même si cet examen national ne peut pas résoudre le problème
de la corruption dans l’éduaction supérieure, sa mise en place dans tout le territoire russe paraît
pourtant être inévitable.

Introduction
Perceptions are in no way a perfect measure of corruptness, be it in Russia or any
other country. Nevertheless, publicized perceptions are important when it comes
to shaping popular opinion and directing public discourse. The 2011 Corruption
Perceptions Index (CPI) by Transparency International (2011), which measures
the perceived levels of public sector corruption in 183 countries and territories
around the world, assigned Russia a score of only 2.4 out of 10. Russia was
placed in the 143rd position, so the country ranks with such former Soviet
republics as Belorussia and Azerbaijan, and such African nations as Nigeria and
Uganda. The CPI ranks countries based on how corrupt their public sector is
perceived to be, on a scale of 0 - 10, where 0 means that a country is perceived as
highly corrupt and 10 means that a country is perceived as very clean.
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This paper considers corruption in higher education in Russia, including
such aspects as corruption in admissions to higher education institutions (HEIs)
and in grading and assessment of academic progress. It sets a theoretical frame of
public discourse around traditional questions set by Russian classics
Chernyshevsky, Gertsen, Tolstoy, and Dostoevsky: “Who is Guilty?” and “What
to Do?” (Tarasov, 2008, pp. 7-8). Corruption is considered in the context of
comprehensive educational reform. The major focus of this study is on the likely
reasons for corruption in the higher education sector, as well as current attempts
and possible ways to tackle corruption, including the newly introduced
standardized testing. The discourses around corruption in Russian HEIs, as
perpetuated through the popular media, have particular effects. This study
analyzes the way the media have covered the problem of corruption in higher
education in Russia for the period from 1998 to 2011 in order to demonstrate that
HEIs focusing on the EGE deflects attention away from internal corruption
within the HEIs. As entry examinations are not the cause of corruption,
standardized testing is no treatment for corruption in higher education.
The problem of educational corruption
Corruption is generally defined as the abuse of public office for private gain
(Anechiarico & Jacobs, 1995). Petrov and Temple (2004) narrowly define
corruption as an act that implies illegality. They do not accept the notion of “grey
areas” as related to corruption (Osipian, 2012). Thus, they deny the possibility of
an existing continuum from uncorrupt to corrupt. The notion of a grey area as it
relates to educational corruption may be introduced in order to point to the
existing grey areas, not in the legislation itself, but in the way the legislation may
be interpreted in respect to corruption in the education sector. According to this
approach, the issue is one of interpretation and applicability rather than that of
continuity. However, corruption in higher education can also be defined as a
system of informal relations established to regulate unsanctioned access to
material and nonmaterial assets through abuse of the office of public or corporate
trust (Osipian, 2007). There are a variety of forms of corruption that may be
found in higher education in Russia, including bribery, embezzlement, extortion,
fraud, nepotism, cronyism, favoritism, kickbacks, transgressing rules and
regulations, reduced class time and increased class size, unauthorized tutoring,
ghost instructors, bypass of criteria in selection and promotion, office
malfeasance, cheating, plagiarism, research misconduct, discrimination, and
abuse of university property. A bribe can be in the form of cash, merchandise,
service, or a monetary donation. Forms of educational corruption in Russian

82

Canadian and International Education Vol. 41 no. 1 - June 2012

higher education are not unique to Russia and may be found in other countries as
well.
Classifications of forms of corruption in higher education and their
detailed analysis are presented in the works of Hallak and Poisson (2007),
Osipian (2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2012), and Rumyantseva (2005). The authors
delineate major functions of higher education and show how they are affected by
corruption. The model of corruption and coercion as a mechanism of state control
and prevention of university autonomy, as related to post-Soviet transition, is
presented in Osipian (2007a, 2008a, 2008c, 2009, 2010). Hallak and Poisson
(2007) present an exhaustive list of forms in which corruption manifests itself in
the education sector throughout the world. They develop a managerial or an
administrative approach to reflect on corruption in secondary and higher
education institutions in several countries, including Russia. Petrov and Temple
(2004) offer a review of major problems of corruption in higher education in the
Russian Federation and Azerbaijan, with the emphasis on need-based bribery
versus extortions. The authors comment that while in Azerbaijan bribery takes
the form of a direct extortion committed by faculty against students, in Russia,
corruption among faculty members is largely explained by the low salaries and
the need to ask students for gifts and donations. These assertions are based on a
series of interviews conducted by the authors.
The higher education sector in the post-Soviet states is certainly not a
zone free of corruption. The Rector of Moscow State University (MGU), Victor
Sadovnichy, admits that “corruption touched education as well.” (Gazeta.ru,
2007) He sees the root of widespread corruption among the faculty members in
their low pay (NTV, 2001). Sanghera and Romanchuk (2002) come to a similar
conclusion, pointing out the importance of the miserable salaries of educators as
well as the willingness of many students to bribe their way into academia. Round
and Rodgers (2009) use interviews in selected HEIs in Ukraine as the basis for
qualitative research on corruption in higher education. The problem of
educational corruption is also linked to social cohesion.
Theoretical frame
This paper focuses on the notion of public discourse for the theoretical
framework of the study. Wolf (2004) presents the following view on public
discourse and its role in influencing mass opinion:
I understand public discourse to be largely a mediation of experience, a medium
that shapes how people think about major events and then responds to popular
thinking. It is comprised primarily of news and critical commentary, reports and
analyses of public reaction, and then further observations based on popular
response. In France, where wars of words are common and the views of
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intellectuals especially prominent, it is not only an indication of what opinionmakers are thinking, but also a window onto popular opinion. The latter is a
rather transient phenomenon, refracted only partially through each of the various
lenses through which it can be viewed, and public discourse is no exception. But
to the extent that commentators both shape and are shaped by mass opinion,
public discourse is an ongoing dialogue between critics and the populace (p. 3).

Stromberg (2001) offers a model which presents a number of testable
hypotheses concerning the mass media’s effect on redistribution, taxes,
corruption, trade barriers, and political business cycles. He asserts: “Empirically,
we would expect to see more corruption and generally less efficient government
policies in countries or regions where only few voters have access to an
independent media source.” (Stromberg, 2001, p. 657) The United States Agency
for International Development (USAID) presented a very basic analysis of media
coverage on the topic of corruption in higher education between June 5, 1999 and
September 5, 2003 in Bulgaria. With the fall of the Soviet bloc, the media is
much less controlled by the state. A relatively free and independent media reports
on problems which, in the Soviet era, were left unattended. One such problem is
corruption in higher education.
The media facilitates distribution and dissemination of information
further among the masses, shaping and channeling public perceptions, and when
it reports on public perceptions, it enforces the trend even more. There is more to
it, however. The media may be as good at shaping popular opinion and directing
public discourse as it is at disguising or hiding certain issues, which may be even
more important and more fundamental than those the media is highlighting.
Thus, the role of the media, including both official news sources and independent
media, is not only to focus on urgent problems, but also can be to distract the
attention of the masses from underlying processes and forces hidden beyond the
reforms. Simply put, the media makes some processes and phenomena even more
visible, while keeping others, including fundamental changes, much less visible
than they really ought to be.
The media has some responsibility over what and how it reports, and
often resorts to the use of manipulative techniques in order to advance certain
political agenda. As far as the Russian higher education sector is concerned,
corruption and its widely publicized antidote, standardized testing, are the focus
of a heated public debate. Specifically, by presenting interviews, cases, and some
superficial data on higher education corruption, the media manipulates public
opinion and diverts the discussion from such fundamental issues as
commercialization and privatization taking place in Russian higher education.
Corruption is a consequence, not a cause. Furthermore, notable social figures,
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who take part in media discussions, as well as the institutions they represent, use
the discourse, set by the media, in order to channel the attention and the
discussion away from real problems and into imaginary solutions. Naturally, the
standardized test becomes a subject of national public discourse. The discussion
over standardized testing, including its merits and shortfalls, even though
productive and useful, is still far short of the deep analysis needed to comprehend
the magnitude and depth of the problem of corruption in education.
Methodology
In order to follow public discourse on the problem of corruption in higher
education in Russia, we study two major news outlets, Gazeta.ru and
Newsru.com, both of which are published daily in the Russian language. These
are independent media outlets, not connected with the Russian government. The
first source, Gazeta.ru, features a large specialized “Education” section. We take
into account news both in this specialized “Education” section and in other
sections. The second source, Newsru.com, offers news reports on all aspects of
life in Russia and abroad, including news in science and education. It absorbs
media reports presented in numerous Russian media outlets and presents them in
a more concise way, giving proper reference to original sources. Newsru.com is,
in a way, a composite index of the Russian media, similar to the Dow Jones
Index on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), if such a comparison is at all
possible. We have read these two media sources daily for fourteen years, from
1998 to 2011. We found reading news sources a much more reliable way for
selecting necessary reports, rather than simply using key words to search these
sources’ archives. We were recording the news on bribery, kickbacks, fraud,
embezzlement, extortion, nepotism, cheating, plagiarism, misconduct, office
malfeasance, corruption scandals, abuse of faculty and administrative offices for
private gain, operation of diploma mills, and production of fraudulent diplomas.
It appears that such occurrences and practices in the Russian higher education
sector are not rare. Selected media sources feature news on higher education
corruption every year.
The media follows particular cases of corruption in higher education, be
it a faculty member caught red-handed while accepting a bribe in exchange for
arranging an admission to a prestigious HEI, a university official embezzling
funds from the HEI’s budget, or well-trained and academically strong
impersonators taking college admissions tests instead of their clients, high school
graduates, who allegedly pay them for such services. Media also reflects on
legislative changes, such as new education laws, state licensing and accreditation,
college admission rules, number of state-financed scholarships, and introduction
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and administration of standardized testing. Lastly, the media presents interviews
with leading Russian educators and educational officials, expressing their
opinions and sharing views on the problem of educational corruption and
numerous related issues. It also offers views and insights of politicians on the
problem of corruption in HEIs along with their suggestions on how to curb
education corruption.
In addition to the aforementioned three major blocs of reported
subjects—particular cases of corruption in higher education, legislative changes
and their implementation, and interviews with leading educators, educational
officials, and politicians—there is also a public opinion bloc. One part of this
public opinion bloc consists of results of polls and surveys on the topic of
education corruption, conducted by public opinion research groups and state
agencies and reported in the media. Another part of this bloc consists of opinions
of individuals expressed in media outlets and resembles a kind of public forum.
For instance, Gazeta.ru features a section of notes and opinions where
representatives from the general public express their views and share their
experiences related to educational corruption. Specifically, some individuals
from the general public share their experiences in entering HEIs, taking the
standardized test, and reporting on experiences of their relatives, friends, and
acquaintances. Even though such accounts are less reliable than media reports on
particular cases of corruption investigated by law enforcement agencies, they are
no less important in terms of influencing public perceptions and shaping public
opinion on educational corruption.
Educational corruption in Russia
There are over one thousand HEIs in the Russian Federation (RF), of which some
are funded by the federal government, some by the regional authorities and local
municipalities, and some as private, for-profit colleges. In addition, there are
numerous public community colleges and vocational schools. Public HEIs
accommodate around 80 percent of all the nation’s students, while another 20
percent attend private colleges. Half of all the students in public colleges and
universities are funded by the government (Goskomstat, 2010). The admissions
to governmentally funded scholarships in educational programs are corrupt.
Course grades can also be bought from faculty members. Other items and
services for sale include diplomas, theses, term papers, and even
accommodations in student dormitories.
The level of tolerance of corruption in higher education in Russia is
relatively high, as corruption is considered a part of everyday life. Petrov and
Temple (2004, p. 92) note that “In Russia, our interviewees also despised bribery,
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but at the same time expressed the view that, perhaps, in the present situation,
corrupt practices in higher education were inevitable.” Based on the 1999 survey,
Spiridonov (2000, p. 245) concludes that in Russia the corrupt bureaucrat is
regarded as an “absolutely normal element of real life.” The level of transparency
is high as well, with corruption in education often being highlighted in the mass
media, by both official and independent sources (RosBusinessConsulting RBC
News, September 20, 2003). These publications are based on interviews with
leading educators and public officials, simple generalizations, and particular legal
cases. The presence of corruption in education is acknowledged by the state
authorities while the problem is discussed openly in society (RIA Novosti, 2004).
Numerous accusations of corruption as related to higher education,
admissions and academic process, and, more recently, the standardized test,
which is described below, necessitate presenting some estimates about the scale
and scope of corruption in the nation’s education industry. There were over eight
thousand economic crimes in education reported in Russia for the period of 2000
to 2005. In the year 2005 alone, there were more than three thousand crimes
committed, including 849 cases of bribery and 361 cases of embezzlement, gross
waste, and misallocation of the resources that came from the central budget
(Gazeta.ru, 2006). Most of these crimes were committed by the heads of colleges
and schools, members of the admissions committees, students, and high school
graduates. The Higher School of Economics in Moscow conducted research on
corruption in education and came out with the following astonishing estimates:
During the 2002-2003 academic year Russians spent 26.5 billion rubles on
informal payments for their children’s education. Of this money, 21.4 billion
rubles were spent on bribes for admissions and positive grades in colleges
(Newsru.com, 2004a).
According to the Chief of the Department of Economic Security of the
Ministry of the Interior, in 2005 the sum of the material damage caused by the
criminal activities was equal to more than 430 million rubles, i.e. less than 20
million nominal CAD. Sixty-seven criminal cases concerning heads of
educational institutions and officials of selection committees, including six
members of the selection committees, nine officials of the territorial educational
organizations, five rectors and deans, seven professors and senior lecturers, and
forty directors and assistants to directors of educational institutions have been
investigated. Criminal charges were brought against the members of the
admissions committees in the Omsk, Volgograd, and Lipetsk regions
(Newsru.com, June 21, 2006).
Forged educational documents turned into a big business with
international connections, pointing to a price of up to 20,000 CAD for some
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forgeries. Criminal groups involved in production and distribution of diplomas
and other educational documents and certificates were exposed all over the RF,
including the Sakhalin, Hakassia, Kaluzhskaya, Kaliningradskaya, Moskovskaya,
Tul’skaya, and Krasnodarskiy regions. Dozens, if not hundreds, of Russian websites still offer diplomas for sale. The scale and scope of corruption in the
Russian education industry is impressive. It might be no different from many
other countries, and is likely less prevalent than in Central Asia and Caucasus
(See, for instance, Orkodashvily, 2010, 2011; Osipian, 2009; Rumyantseva,
2004; Sanghera & Romanchuk, 2002; Silova, Johnson & Heyneman, 2007), but
the rate of growth of the criminal activities in education in Russia is alarming.
From Kaliningrad in the West to Sakhalin in the Far East and from Moscow to
Krasnodarskij kraj in the South, corruption in education is being exposed and
investigated. At the same time the number of accused corrupt educators is
incredibly small.
Reznik (Gazeta.ru, 2010) presents the case of an extortion of $15,000
from a private HEI for additional permission to use a historically significant
building in Moscow, committed by a Moscow government bureaucrat. A famous
Russian blogger and anti-corruption activist, Alexei Naval’ny, complained to the
Prosecutor’s office and demanded an investigation about the rector of Ural’s
HEI, who bought a luxury Lexus at the university’s expense while already having
two BMWs (Newsru.com, 2011a). The roof of Sankt-Petersburg Conservatory,
which just went through a major repair, is leaking: forty classrooms and the
library are flooded (Newsru.com, 2011e). A second criminal investigation has
been opened regarding the embezzlement of state funds in Sankt-Petersburg
Conservatory (Newsru.com, 2011d). Economic crimes and misallocation of
funds, including the alleged theft of state funds in the Conservatory case, misuse
of the HEI money in the Lexus case, and similar cases are not examples of
academic corruption, but still manifest corruption in the higher education sector.
The majority of investigated cases target educational officials, including
rectors of colleges and directors of schools, who embezzle from the state budget.
This means that those involved in corrupt activities other than embezzling from
the state funds are virtually invulnerable. Even in the broadly publicized case of a
bribe-taking faculty member from MGU, who demanded a bribe of 35,000 Euro
in exchange for arranging an admission to MGU, the perpetrator received a
suspended sentence (Newsru.com, 2011c). In yet another case, a Vice-Rector of
one of Moscow’s HEIs received a suspended sentence for taking bribes from
students (Gazeta.ru, 2011). The message is clear to educators and the public. If
educational corruption is widespread and at the same time only a few corrupt
educators are prosecuted, then participating in bribery and extortion appears to be
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a relatively safe business for faculty members, students, and their parents. Also,
this information strengthens the public’s perceptions that everything can be
bought and sold, the risk of being prosecuted is nominal, and there is no reason to
try to appeal to the law (Newsru.com, 2008). An increase in such perceptions
further facilitates an increase in corrupt activities.
Standardized testing as a response to corruption
In the USSR, all colleges and universities were fully funded by the state. At the
same time in Russia, a country consisting of eighty-nine regions, a population of
one hundred and fifty million, and covering eleven time zones, there was no
universal national standardized examination for high school graduates. In order
to enter any HEI, high school graduates had to be present at the college of their
choice to pass competitive entry examinations. Some households were unable to
cover travel expenses for their children to a university of their choice to take
entry examinations. Some candidates with high academic potential did not risk
competing for places in top schools. If not accepted, they would not be able to
compete even in lower tier colleges, since the time for entry examinations would
be over.
The reform, which was enacted in 2001, involved introducing a
standardized, computer-graded examination to be used for entrance to
universities. The Unified State Examination (Edinyj gosudarstvennyj ekzamen or
EGE) is analogous to US national educational tests, such as the SAT and ACT,
the French Baccalaureate, and other national examinations, and is referred to as
the national test. The test is now administered nationwide and considered,
nominally, as the major criterion in admissions decisions.
Supporters of the new examination system argue that the reform will
create equal opportunities in access to higher education, prevent corruption, and
make higher education a demand-driven industry. Intervention is based on the
assumption that since low-income households cannot pay tuition and cannot
afford to pay for their children to travel far from home to take entry
examinations, and that entry examinations are corrupted, implementation of the
national examinations will increase access to higher education for children from
lower-income households (Adamskiy, 2002).
The support for the standardized testing and admissions to colleges based
on the results of the test is as strong as the opposition to it. One of the most
outspoken opponents to standardized testing is the Chair of the Council of the
Federation, Sergey Mironov. He blames the test not for its poor organization, but
for its concept and major underlying ideas: “Such an approach in evaluation of
knowledge disorients the entire national system of education, disorients young

Education canadienne et internationale Vol. 41 no 1 - juin 2012

89

people, who are being told that the deepness of knowledge is not that important;
what is important is the ability to memorize or even guess the right answer to the
question, which itself is not necessarily a correctly formulated question.”
(Newsru.com, , 2010)
In 2004, an open letter, entitled “No to the destructive experiments in
education,” signed by over four hundred leading educators and researchers was
sent to the then Russian President, Vladimir Putin (Newsru.com, 2004b). The
testing agencies are being accused of corruption (Newsru.com, 2007a), and the
results of the test are also being placed in doubt (Semenova, Dolgih & Shergina,
2007; Newsru.com, 2007b). The President of the All-Russian Education Fund,
Sergey Komkov, says that the major problem of the EGE is that it strengthens
corruption in education. The Director of the Federal Testing Center, Vladimir
Hlebnikov, also admits the fact of corruptness in the EGE (Lemutkina, 2005,
2006).
Scandals accompanied standardized testing from its very inception,
strengthening positions of those who criticize the testing initiative. In a recent
scandal, which shook the credibility of the test results, a group of highly trained
impersonators sat the test instead of high school graduates. These Moscow
students, who took the EGE instead of school pupils, will be dismissed from
HEIs, although they may be reinstated later (Newsru.com, 2011b).
What to do?
The media reports the annual volume of corrupt money in Russian education at
$5.5 billion (Gazeta.ru, 2010). This highly speculative estimate underlines the
admission that Russian higher education is corrupt. The acceptance of guilt
necessitates a public repentance, but even more so, it urges an active response.
The question of “What to do?” anticipates a political activist agenda. Can
standardized testing be the satisfactory and continuing answer to this question, an
exhaustive solution for the problem of educational corruption, or at least the
solution to corruption in admissions to colleges and universities?
HEIs are guilty, because they de facto allow faculty members to take
bribes in exchange for positive admissions decisions; the state is guilty because it
pays low wages to faculty members, forcing them into corrupt activities; and the
test is also “guilty” because it is also corrupt. HEIs are happy to switch public
attention from their internal corruption problems to the corruption problems with
the EGE, for this kind of shift leaves HEIs with more room for maneuvering and
indeed improving their reputation, badly damaged by corruption scandals. HEIs
continue to invent new ways of retaining control over admissions decisions,
taking the test results as one of the components for decision making, but not the
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only one. As the EGE is no longer perceived by the public as a panacea against
higher education corruption, the question of “What to do?” remains open.
The high cost of education and a growing demand for higher education
from the population, along with the low salaries of the faculty and staff, create
necessary grounds for corruption. An increase in public perceptions of corruption
in higher education, oftentimes supported by the media, facilitates a further
increase in corruption, as well as in the total amount of graft accumulated by the
faculty and staff. Newly designed rules and mechanisms of admissions policies
and administering entry examinations are all parts of a centralized governmental
effort to restructure the higher education sector and to curb corruption.
In order to sort out the most important determinants from the rest, one
should consider first of all economics and demographics in the country and in the
education industry. While the economy is now booming after a decade-long crisis
and stagnation, the number of school students declines, as does the overall
population. The Minister of Science and Education, Andrey Fursenko, predicted
that the number of school students in Russia would decline one-third in 2006,
down to around thirteen million. He said that this number has already declined by
five million during the past few years (Newsru.com, 2006c).
A stable decrease in population will inevitably lead to a decline in
enrollment numbers in HEIs. However, in the long run, the lack of students will
only be partially compensated by the inflow of students from the other former
Soviet republics and from the developing nations. The projections point to the
fact that soon the number of places in Russian HEIs, licensed and accredited by
the government in accordance with all the requirements, will be higher than the
number of those who apply to higher education programs. In fact, the rapid
decline of the number of children in the country, which has already led to the
decline in the number of high school graduates, makes entry examinations
unnecessary. Indeed, the number of places in HEIs will soon be higher than the
number of those who would like to obtain higher education (Lebedev, 2004).
The real competition is not for places in colleges, but for state-funded
scholarships in colleges. The number of the state-funded scholarships in HEIs has
declined in absolute terms. In 2006, Minister Fursenko said that the number of
state-funded places in the Russian HEIs would be reduced. (Newsru.com, May
19, 2006). Russians became accustomed to the idea that education should be free
as in the Soviet era, but this no longer reflects the reality. The situation is such
that parents who received free higher education themselves now have to pay for
higher education for their children. Many perceive the presence of money in the
education sector as a clear indication of corruption, whether it is tuition or bribes.
The Director of the Department of the State Policy in Education, Isaak Kalina,
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asserted in 2006 that the federal HEIs will be able to enroll 529,000 students in
state-funded studentships in 2007, of which 372,000 will be full-time students in
day-time programs. The number of state-funded studentships will be reduced
only in the humanities, economics and management, as well as pedagogical
sciences and education because there is not sufficient demand for these
qualifications in the labor market. At the same time, the number of state-funded
places in vocational schools was to increase one percent (Newsru.com, 2006a).
Supporters of the EGE consider the test an ideal measurement tool for
the academic progress and success achieved by high school students. They think
that the EGE is good because it presents a real picture of the knowledge of high
school graduates. It is still unclear, however, why it would be necessary to
consider the EGE as a prerequisite for entering a HEI. If the standardized test
will not serve the role of the single most important criterion in the selection
process and admissions decisions, especially to the state-funded places, then it
will only be left with its function of control over high school outcomes. This
function will denigrate the EGE to yet another useless threshold in academic life
that can easily be ignored.
Conclusion
In conclusion, we would like to highlight the following few points. The Russian
higher education sector suffers from a significant level of corruption. Educational
corruption and its widely publicized antidote, standardized testing also known as
EGE, are the focus of a heated public debate, which is played out in the media.
The media manipulates public opinion and diverts the discussion from such
fundamental issues as the commercialization and privatization taking place in
Russian higher education. It makes some processes and phenomena even more
visible, while keeping others, including fundamental changes, much less visible
than they really ought to be. Corruption in entry examinations is a consequence
of an imbalance in the distribution of market-based and state-based incentives for
faculty, HEIs, and students, i.e. providers and consumers of educational services.
It is not a cause of unfair admissions. Accordingly, the EGE is no treatment to
HEIs, riddled with corruption. The EGE is not even able to solve the problem of
corruption in admissions to HEIs, less so corruption in retention, grading,
examinations, and other academic benchmarks and requirements. At the same
time, HEIs focusing on the EGE deflect attention away from internal corruption
within the HEIs. Furthermore, notable social figures, who take part in media
discussions, as well as the institutions they represent, use the discourse, set by the
media, in order to channel the attention and the discussion away from real
problems and into imaginary solutions. Supporters of the new examination
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system argue that the reform will create equal opportunities in access to higher
education, prevent corruption, and make higher education a demand-driven
industry. Naturally, the EGE becomes a subject of national public discourse. The
discussion over standardized testing, including its merits and shortfalls, even
though productive and useful, is still far short of the deep analysis needed to
comprehend the magnitude and depth of the problem of corruption in Russian
higher education. As the EGE is no longer perceived by the public as a panacea
against higher education corruption, the question of “What to do?” remains open.
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